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Copyright law as applied to computer software attempts to balance the
interests of software developers and software users. Copyright law protects the
interests of software developers by giving them exclusive rights to reproduce,
prepare derivative works from, and publicly distribute their computer
programs.' Software developers' exclusive rights to reproduce their programs
must, by necessity, be limited because programs, and hence computers, cannot
be used without copying the programs. Therefore, to protect software users'
rights, copyright law must acknowledge and shelter those circumstances under
which copying of programs is required for the computer to be used.
The computer software case of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc.,2 as decided by the Ninth Circuit, illustrates the problem of balancing the
interests of software developers and users. This Comment explores the problem
by critiquing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the MAI Systems case. Part II
explains the circumstances under which the copying of software is required so
that it may be used. Part I reviews the case of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc. Part IV presents important factors the Ninth Circuit failed to
consider in deciding MAI Systems. Part V reviews the case of Advanced
Computer Services v. MAI Systems Corp. , a related case in which MAI
Systems Corporation (MAI) asserted the favorable decision from MAI Systems
against other parties. Part VI presents some difficulties in applying the MA
Systems and Advanced Computer Services decisions in other situations.
1 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Section 106 states in part:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of a copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies...;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies.., of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or... by lease ....
Id. § 106 (1)-(3).
2 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
3 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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II. TIE NECESSITY OF COPYING TO USE COMPUTER SOFrWARE
Computer software presents unique copyright protection problems because
it must be copied to be used by the computer. Copying is required due to the
fact that computers can use only programs that are in "executable" form.4
Software developers write computer programs that are sequences of
instructions telling the computer how to accomplish a task.5 Software
developers do not write computer programs in a form that computers
understand and can use. Executable computer programs (programs that a
computer understands and can use) are the result of a multi-step translation of
the software developer's original work. 6 The translation of the original work
into an executable form is accomplished through the use of other specialized
4 JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH
TECHNOLOGY LAW 25 (1991). The word "executable" is used to distinguish programs that
are in a form the computer can execute from programs in a form the computer cannot
execute. Executable code is also called machine code, machine-readable code, machine
language code, and object code. See, e.g., V. CARL HAMACHER ET AL., COMPUTER
ORGANIzATIoN 300-01 (1978) ("A machine language program can be executed on that
computer without the aid of any other program.").
For additional technical background information, see Mark M. Friedman,
Copyrighting Machine Language Computer Software-The Case Against, 9 COMPUTER L.J.
1 (1989). Friedman argues:
Two fundamental constitutional difficulties arise in using copyright law to protect
machine readable [executable] software. First, such software is a utilitarian work, not
the constitutionally mandated "writings." Furthermore, machine language [executable]
code does not communicate to human beings, rendering moot the disclosure
requirement which is part of the social contract forming the underlying constitutional
basis for copyright protection-the promotion of "Science and the Useful Arts."
Id. at 18 (citations omitted); see also Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case
Against opyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machdne-Readable Form, 1984
DUKE L.J. 663. Samuelson argues the constitutional goal of promoting the progress of
science and the arts is undermined "because software manufacturers generally market only
machine-readable [executable] forms of programs, thereby withholding not only their ideas,
but much or all of the manner in which those ideas are expressed." Id. at 672. Furthermore,
"[i]n machine-readable [executable] form, the utility of computer programs cannot be
separated from their non-utilitarian aspects, and for this reason as well they ought to be
deemed uncopyrightable." Id. at 741.
5 VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 4, at 24; see also CHRISTOPHER J. MILLARD, LEGAL
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA 13 (1985).
6 VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 4, at 24-25.
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computer programs called compilers, linkers, and loaders.7 It is the resulting
executable code that software vendors distribute to users.8
Once the executable code has been installed on the machine, the computer
must make one or more copies of the program's instructions in order to run the
program. First, the program instructions must be loaded or "copied" into the
computer's random access memory (RAM). 9 At any time, it is possible that
only a portion of the program is in RAM. As each instruction of the program is
about to be executed, it is copied from RAM to the computer's instruction
register. 10 Therefore, at this point, there are at least two copies of the
program's instructions in the computer. Depending on the configuration of the
computer's hardware, additional copies may be present (e.g., in cache
memory)., I
Whether every instruction of the program is copied during the course of
program execution depends upon, among other things, the program's design,
the amount of memory available, and what the user wants the computer to do
as the program executes. For short, simple tasks, the computer may copy only
a small portion of the entire program's set of instructions.' 2 For long,
complicated tasks, the computer may eventually copy every program
instruction, possibly more than once.13
Computer software thus differs from other types of copyrighted works
because it must be copied to be used by the computer and hence, the user.14
Other types of copyrighted works, such as books and recordings, need not be
copied by the reader or listener to be used.15 Because computer software must
be copied to be used, it is important to determine in what contexts copying for
use is, or should be, permitted by copyright law.
7 Id. at 25; MILLARD, supra note 5, at 14.
8 VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 4, at 23.
9 HAMACHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 ("To perform a given task, an appropriate
program consisting of a set of instructions is stored in the main memory."). For a detailed,
technical discussion of program execution, see id. at 96-107.
10 Id. at 9-12. The Central Processing Unit (CPU) contains one or more high-speed
storage cells called registers. Id. at 9. For program execution, data is transferred between
the CPU registers and memory. Id. at 11. The CPU's instruction register contains the
instruction being executed. Id.
II Id. at 245. A cache memory is a special, fast memory that contains active segments
of programs so total execution time of the program is reduced. Id.
12 Id. at 229-30, 252-54.
13 Id.
14 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-103 (2d ed. 1992)
(noting a program in machine language can be used only through preparation of a copy).
15 Id. (noting books can be read without copying).
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]IlI. THE NINTH CiRcuIT's OPINION IN MA SYSTEMS CORP. V. PEAK
COMPUTER, INC.
The MR1 Systems'6 case is important because it places limitations on users'
rights to copy software for execution on a computer. To understand these
limitations, it is necessary to review the MA Systems case and examine the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of the copyright infringement issue.
A. Facts and Procedural History
MAI manufactures computers. 17 It also designs and implements software
that runs on the computers it manufactures.' 8 The software is licensed to
customers "for their own internal information processing." 19 MAI licenses
allow for the loading of the software into RAM by MAI customers, but
prohibit "[a]ny possession or use ... not expressly authorized." 20 MAI
customers are not permitted to make the software available to others. 2' Finally,
MAI services the hardware and software for its machines. 22 Peak Computer
(Peak), organized by a former MAI employee, is an independent service
organization that maintains computer systems for its clients. 23 Peak's clients
include customers of MAI's computer systems.
MAI has copyright interests in the software it designs and implements,
including the operating system software that is required to run other programs
on the computer.24 MAI's operating system software is designed to load
automatically from the hard disk into the computer's RAM every time the
computer is turned on.25 Servicing of the computer-whether by Peak service
technicians or anyone else-requires that the computer be turned on and thus,
the automatic loading of the operating system into RAM takes place.
16 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
17 Id. at 513. MAI has since filed for bankruptcy protection and reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
181d.
19 Id. at 517.
20 Id. at 517 n.3.
21 Id. at 517.
22 Id. at 513.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 513, 515.
25 Id. at 517.
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MAI filed suit against Peak for copyright infringement. 26 MAI claimed that
Peak violated its copyright interest in the operating system software when it
was loaded into RAM after Peak turned on the computer for servicing. 27 MAI
argued that the loading of the operating system into RAM constituted copying
for the purposes of copyright law.28 In the absence of permission to copy the
software, MAI argued that such an act was infringement. 29 According to MAI,
Peak's use of the software was a use not expressly authorized under the MAI
licensing agreement.
Upon a motion filed by MAI, the district court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of MAI and issued a permanent injunction enjoining Peak
from copying any of MAI's copyrighted works.30 The copying enjoined
included "the acts of loading, or causing to be loaded, directly or indirectly,
any MAI software... into... [RAM] of a computer system." 31 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of partial summary judgment
and the permanent injunction on the issue of copyright infringement. 32
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision
As owner of a copyright interest in its operating system software, MAI had
the exclusive rights to reproduce and publicly distribute the copyrighted
work,33 subject to some limitations. 34 To prevail in its copyright infringement
action against Peak, MAI was required to prove ownership of a copyright and
copying that exceeded the scope of the license. 35 To prove ownership, MAI
26 Id. at 513, 517. In its complaint, MAI also alleged misappropriation of trade secrets,
trademark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition. Id. at 513.2 7 Id. at 518.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 517.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 515.
3 2 Id. at 519.
33 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3) (1988). Section 106(1) gives the owner of the copyright
the exclusive right to reproduce or authorize the reproduction of the copyright work in
copies. Section 106(3) gives the owner of the copyright the exclusive right to distribute
copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending.
34 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The limitations are set forth in §§ 107
through 120 of the Copyright Act. Id.
35 MA Sys., 991 F.2d at 517 (citing S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081,
1085 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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provided the court with its copyright registrations. 36 Thus, the only significant
issues facing the court were whether MAI's software was copied by Peak and
whether Peak's copying of the protected work was beyond the scope of the
licensing agreement with MAI customers. 37
1. Did Peak Copy MAI's Operating System Software?
Under the Copyright Act,38  "copies" are defined as "material
objects ... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 39 A work is fixed if it "is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration."40
Peak argued it did not copy the operating system software because the copy
made in RAM was not fixed. 41 As soon as the computer was turned off, the
contents of RAM disappeared. 42 Therefore, the copy in RAM was transient.
The court, however, was convinced that because after loading the software it
was possible to view information regarding the computer's status, the copy in
RAM met the "sufficiently permanent or stable" requirement of the Copyright
Act.43
36 Id. at 515. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the owner of a
copyright may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright
Office a copy of the work, an application, and an application fee. Although registration is
not a prerequisite for the attachment of copyright interests, it is a prerequisite for an action
for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1988), a registration "constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and
of the facts stated in the certificate." Therefore, in producing the registrations, MAI
produced rebuttable presumptions of ownership.
37 It should be noted that, according to the facts of the case, Peak possessed and used
some unlicensed copies of MAI software. MI Sys., 991 F.2d at 519. Peak's possession and
use of unlicensed MAI software clearly violates MAI copyright interests. The focus of the
criticism in this Comment is on the court's conclusion that Peak violated MA's copyright
interests by using operating system software licensed to, and within the lawful possession of,
MAI customers.
38 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
39 Id. § 101.
40 Id.
41 MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518.
42 VERGARI & SHUE, supra note 4, at 16; HAMACHER ET AL., supra note 4, at 234.
43 MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518.
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2. Was Peak's Copying Unauthorized?
Under MAI's licensing agreement, only customers were permitted to use
the software. 44 Customers were not permitted to make the software available to
others. 45 Peak, as a third party to the transaction between MAI and its
customers, was not permitted to use the software. Therefore, the court found
that Peak's use of the operating system software exceeded the scope of the
licensing agreement and, as a result, was unauthorized. 46 The court thus
interpreted the provision prohibiting MAI customers from making the software
available to others to include a prohibition on authorizing others to use the
programs in the computer.
3. Rejection of the Copyright Act's Section 117 Computer Program
Limitation
In completing its analysis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the application of
section 117 of the Copyright Act which provides a computer program specific
limitation on a copyright owner's exclusive rights. 47 Pursuant to section 117,
the owner of a computer program is permitted to make or authorize the making
of another copy of that program provided "that such a new copy... is created
as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner." 48 Thus, by authority of
section 117 the owner of the copy "acquires a protected interest in being able
to exercise its ownership and make use of its copy." 49
44 MId. at 517 n.3.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 518.
47 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 117, "Limitations on exclusive
rights: Computer programs," states in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another
copy ... of a computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy... is created as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner ....
Id. § 117(1) (Supp. V 1993).
48 Id.
49 NIMMER, supra note 14, at 1-102.
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Although it is not clear what factors the court considered, it concluded that
MAI customers are licensees rather than owners of the programs so they are
not eligible for protection under section 117. Therefore, the copying by Peak
could not be authorized by an MAI customer. 50 In concluding that Peak
violated MAI's copyright interests, the court limited its concern to the
"permitted scope [of use] of licensed software." 51 The court focused on the
contract, as established by the licensing agreement, between MAI and its
customer. The court found that Peak was guilty of copyright infringement
because the software was copied under a scenario not identified in the licensing
agreement. The conclusion was reached without any consideration of whether
Peak's actions were beneficial to the licensees and whether Peak's actions were
detrimental to MAI's copyright interests.
IV. IMPORTANT FACTORS IGNORED BY THE MAISYSTEMS COURT
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Peak was guilty of copyright
infringement is problematic because it resulted in MAI using its copyright
interests in its software to control who used the computer. By prohibiting
Peak's use of the computer, MAI effectively extended its copyright monopoly
by reserving an exclusive right to service the hardware on which the software
runs. Therefore, MAI's copyright interests were used to protect the value of a
secondary repair market rather than the market for the copyrighted work itself.
Such a result defeats the purpose of copyright law which is to protect an
author's interest in the copyrighted work.52 The M4 Systems court could have
concluded that Peak did not violate MAI's copyright interests under two
scenarios. First, the court could have concluded that the section 117 limitation
was applicable because MAI customers were owners rather than licensees.
Second, whether the issue of authorization for copying was governed by
section 117 or by a licensing agreement, the court could have applied a fair use
analysis to conclude Peak's copying should be sheltered under copyright law.
50 MA Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.5 ("Since MAI licensed its software, the Peak
customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not eligible for protection
under § 117.").
51 See, e.g., Stephen J. Davidson, Selected Legal and Practical Considerations
Concerning 'Scope of Use' Provisions, 10 THE COMPUTER LAW. 1, 1 (1993) (expressing
concern that in some situations, licensing restrictions or lack of express authorization for a
particular use "may be used by the licensor in an effort to extract excessive license or
renewal fees").52 Robert A. Kreiss, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1497,
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A. The Section 117 Computer Program Limitation on Exclusive Rights
Without explanation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the application of section
117 in a single footnote claiming that "since MAI licensed its software, the
Peak customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not eligible
for protection under section 117." 53 However, in deciding whether section 117
applies to a transaction, some commentators have proposed looking beyond the
vendor's characterization of the transaction as a sale or license.54 The label of
the transaction by which customers obtain the software (e.g., by sale or by
license) should not be controlling. 55 Instead, "[o]wnership of a copy should be
determined on the actual character.., of the transaction by which the user
obtained possession." 56 It should not matter "whether the transaction involved
the sale of the copyright or a license to use the program." 57 In fact, there is
"precedent in copyright caselaw [sic] for disregarding the manufacturer's
characterization of transaction, looking through the form of a transaction to its
substance to find a sale when the manufacturer asserts there is only a
license."58 Among the factors that should be considered are whether a single
payment is made, whether the user has an unlimited right to possession, and
whether the user is required to return the copy after a specified time.59 If the
Ninth Circuit had concluded MAI customers were owners, even though subject
to a licensing agreement, the section 117 limitation would have applied and the
copying would have been authorized, even if MAI did not approve the purpose
for which the copy was made.60 As one court has noted "[s]ection 117(1)
53 MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 518 n.5.
54 NDMER, supra note 14, at 1-102 to 1-103; Pamela Samuelson, Modifying
Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 1988
JuRMETdRicsJ. 179, 188-89.
55 NIMMER, supra note 14, at 1-103.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1-102.
58 Samuelson, supra note 54, at 189 n.46 (citing Straus v. Victor Talking Machine
Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); F.E.L.
Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 923, and cert. denied, 474
U.S. 824 (1985)).
59 NnIMMER, supra note 14, at 1-103.
60 As Nimmer notes, "[i]n computer programs, this ownership issue is often confused
with whether the end user of the program is a licensee. The license, however, relates to
rights in intellectual property. Ownership of a copy is a matter of personal property law."
Id. at 1-102.
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contains no language to suggest that the copy it permits must be employed for a
use intended by the copyright owner." 61
Although section 117 applies only to owners, some commentators argue
that the section-whether by judicial interpretation or a change in wording-
should apply to licensees and lessees as well. 62 The basis for this position is
that the original text of section 117, drafted by the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), included in the
class of beneficiaries all "rightful possessors." 63 In adopting CONTU's
recommended amendments to the copyright statute, Congress changed the text
of section 117 to read "owners of copies" rather than "rightful possessors." 64
Congress gave no explanation for the change.
It is not obvious why licensees and lessees should be excluded from the
safe harbor of section 117.65 Unlike other limitations imposed on copyright
owners' exclusive rights, section 117 is not based on "efficiency
considerations .... consideration of alternative socially productive uses of the
copyrighted work or the need to give authors access to source materials so that
they can use them in creating new work." 66 Section 117 was enacted because
copies of programs must be made for the computer to run. 67 All users, whether
owners, licensees, or lessees need to make copies to run programs. 68 The
change to the word "owner" means computer users' rights differ depending
upon the transaction by which they acquired rightful possession of a program.
61 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
62 Kreiss, supra note 52, at 1535. Kriess cites Vault, 847 F.2d 255 and Foresight
Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989) for the proposition that
a possessor of a copy of a computer program may qualify as an "owner" even though the
possessor was subject to the terms of a licensing agreement. Id. He also cites Hubco Data
Production Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho
1983) for the proposition that Hubco did not qualify as an owner either because Hubco was
a licensee or did not have lawful possession. Id.
63 Samuelson, supra note 54, at 188.
64 Id. Under one view, the word "owner" excludes licensees and lessees from the
protections of section 117. Kreiss, supra note 52, at 1535-36. There is no indication that
"Congress intended the word 'owner' in § 117 to include licensees, lessees, or other
possessors." Id. at 1536. If Congress had meant to include licensees, lessees, and other
possessors, it could have adopted the CONTU recommendation. Id. at 1536-37. Therefore,
pursuant to § 117, "owner" should be given its "ordinary legal meaning" such that only
those who acquire title to the copy of the computer program should benefit from the
protections of§ 117. Id. at 1500, 1535.
65 Kreiss, supra note 52, at 1507.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1538.
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The change defeats the spirit of CONTU's recommendation which was to fulfill
rightful possessors' expectations regarding their use of computer programs and
their ability to authorize others to use those programs under some
circumstances. 69
A liberal interpretation of the word "owner" that extends section 117
protections to licensees and lessees of computer programs seems to support
CONTU's original position. The CONTU Report makes clear:
[The law should provide that persons in rightful possession of copies... be
able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability.
Obviously, creators, lessors, licensors, and vendors of copies of programs
intend that they be used by their customers.... It is easy to imagine,
however, a situation in which the copyright owner might desire, for good
reason or none at all, to force a lawful owner or possessor of a copy to stop
using a particular program. One who rightfully possesses a copy of a program,
therefore, should be provided with a legal right to copy it to that extent which
will permit its use by that possessor.70
As this language indicates, CONTU foresaw the possibility that without the
section 117 exception, a copyright owner could assert his or her copyright
interests to prevent a lawful possessor from using a program in a manner, for
whatever reason, the copyright owner simply does not like. Copyright owners
who wish to control the uses of their programs will license or lease, rather than
sell, copies of their programs to avoid application of section 117. 7 1 Indeed,
many software vendors have adopted the practice of distributing software by
license only, thus effectively stripping "consumers of rights they would
otherwise have under copyright law." 72 According to the CONTU
recommendation, the section was intended to protect all rightful possessors,
including licensees and lessees. In fact, if section 117 protection is not extended
69 Ronald S. Katz & Betsy E. Bayha, Conmentary: Turned On, Turned Off, THE
RECORDER, Apr. 29, 1993, at 8.70 Kreiss, supra note 52, at 1537 (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WoRKs 31 (1978)).
71 Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Independent Service Organizations, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 14, 1993, at 3, 6 (noting that a license could serve to restrict a user's rights under
§ 117).
72 Samuelson, supra note 54, at 188-89; see also Raysman & Brown, supra note 71,
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to licensees or lessees, "it will rarely be applicable to anyone possessing a copy
of computer software.73
Although the Ninth Circuit may have been correct in characterizing MAI
customers as licensees, the court should have provided a basis for its
conclusion. By concluding, without explanation, that MAI customers are
licensees only, the court may have denied MAI customers an important right
provided by copyright law.
B. The Fair Use Exception
In concluding that Peak was guilty of copyright infringement, the Ninth
Circuit considered only whether the copying into RAM was authorized
pursuant to the licensing agreement. The court never considered the possibility
that even though Peak's copying of MAI's software was unauthorized, it fell
within the "fair use" exception. 74 Fair use identifies permissible copying and
"exempts behavior that would otherwise infringe [a] ... copyright." 75 It
attempts to balance the "rights of the... [copyright owner] and the rights of
subsequent users in an environment where the policies supporting
the... [copyright owner's] otherwise absolute rights are attenuated or
inappropriate." 76 The rights of the copyright owner are subject to the fair use
doctrine regardless of the type of copyrighted work.77
The fair use doctrine is recognized in section 107 of the Copyright Act78
and "provides a nonexclusive list of factors considered in determining whether
a particular use is an exempted fair use of a copyrighted work."79 The factors
include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 80
73 Katz & Bayha, supra note 69, at 8; see also Ronald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold,
MAI v. Peak: An Unprecedented Opinion with Sparse Analysis, 10 THE COMPUTER LAW.
18 (1993).
74 Katz & Bayha, supra note 69, at 8. A fair use exception is not discussed in the MAI
Systems opinion. The fact that the court did not discuss the issue suggests that Peak did not
raise a fair use argument in its defense.
75 NnMER, supra note 14, at 1-94.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
79 NIMMER, supra note 14, at 1-95.
80 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As one court noted, "initially... the
fact that copying is for a commercial purpose weighs against a finding of fair use. However,
the presumption of unfairness that arises in such cases can be rebutted by the characteristics
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 8 1
(3) the amount and substantiality, of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; 82 and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 83
If the MA Systems court had applied a fair use analysis to Peak's actions, it
might have concluded that Peak's copying constituted a fair use of MAI's
copyrighted work. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit applied a fair use analysis in a
computer software case that came before it one year earlier-Sega Enterprises
v. Accolade Inc.8 4 Sega develops and markets video game software to run on
its own game consoles. 85 Accolade took a Sega game cartridge containing
executable software and "decompiled" it in order to understand the logic of the
original computer program. 86 Using its knowledge of Sega's original program,
of a particular commercial use." Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
81 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
[This factor] reflects the fact that not all copyrighted works are entitled to the
same level of protection. The protection established by the Copyright
Act... does not extend to the ideas underlying a work or to the functional or
factual aspects of the work. To the extent that a work is functional or factual, it
may be copied....
Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1524 (citations omitted).
82 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "The fact that an entire work was
copied does not.., preclude a finding of fair use." Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526
(citations omitted).
83 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
[This factor] bears a close relationship to the 'purpose and character' inquiry
in that it, too, accommodates the distinction between the copying of works in
order to make independent creative expression possible and the simple exploitation
of another's creative efforts. We must ... inquire whether, "if [the challenged
use] should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for
the copyrighted work," by diminishing potential sales, interfering with
marketability, or usurping the market.
Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1523 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
84 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
85 Id. at 1514.
86 Id. at 1514-15.
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Accolade wrote and sold video games compatible with Sega's game console.87
Accolade's "reverse engineering" of Sega's executable software required
copying.88 Sega sued Accolade for copyright infringement. 89
Accolade's copying of Sega's executable software did not occur as an
"essential step" in using the software in a Sega game console. 90 Therefore, the
court concluded, section 117's exemption for copies created as an essential step
in the use of a computer program did not apply. 91 A fair use analysis was used
to resolve the copyright infringement issue.92 The court considered the
possibility of a fair use exception to Accolade's copying because section 117
does not "preclude the assertion of a fair use defense with respect to uses of
computer programs that are not covered by section 117, nor has section 107
[fair use] been amended to exclude computer programs from its ambit." 93 This
language is particularly important because it suggests that in the MAI Systems
case, even though the court found that section 117 did not apply, the court
should have considered the possibility of a fair use exception.
In analyzing the purpose and character of use (first factor), the Sega court
found the purpose of the copying was to understand the compatibility
requirements of a Sega game.94 It was indisputable that Accolade ultimately
intended to develop and sell a game compatible with the Sega machine. 95 The
court distinguished the ultimate purpose from the direct purpose of the copying
and concluded the direct purpose of the copying was to understand Sega's
executable code.96 Therefore, "Accolade copied Sega's code for a legitimate,
essentially nonexploitative purpose, and that the commercial aspect of its use
can best be described as of minimal significance." 97 The court found this factor
weighed in Accolade's favor.98
The court next analyzed the effect on the potential market for the
copyrighted work (fourth factor).99 This inquiry required the court to
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1516.
89 Id.
90 Accolade created the copy so that it could examine details of the software. It did not
create the copy so that it could play a game on the Sega console. Hence, the copy was not
created as an essential step in using the software.
91 Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520.
92 Id. at 1520-28.
93 Id. at 1520-21.
94 Id. at 1522.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1522-23.
97 Id.
9 8 Id. at 1523.
9 9 Id. at 1523-24.
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determine whether the potential market for the copyrighted work was affected
by "diminishing potential sales, interfering with marketability, or usurping the
market." 100 The court concluded that even though Accolade copied Sega's
software for the ultimate purpose of developing a product compatible with
Sega's machine, there was no significant market effect because Accolade's
game was not substantially similar to Sega's and, therefore, was unlikely to
displace any Sega sales. 1° 1 More importantly, the court noted that "an attempt
to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete runs
counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression." 102
Therefore, this factor weighed in Accolade's favor.' 03
In analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work (second factor), the court
admitted difficulty in characterizing computer software. 10 4 After examining
differences regarding protected expression and unprotected ideas, the court
characterized computer programs as "essentially utilitarian" and concluded that
many aspects of computer programs are not protected by copyright.' 05 As a
result, because "programs contain unprotected aspects that cannot be examined
without copying, [they are afforded] a lower degree of protection than more
traditional literary works." 1°6 Therefore, this factor also weighed in Accolade's
favor.10 7
With respect to the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole (third factor), the court found Accolade
copied the entire work. 10 8 Therefore, this factor weighed in Sega's favor. 10 9
However, the court noted "[tihe fact that an entire work was copied does
not.., preclude a finding [of] a fair use." 110
In Sega, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the fair use factors to conclude that
although Accolade copied Sega's software, it did not violate Sega's copyright
interests. It is surprising that in MAI Systems, the Ninth Circuit did not
consider the possibility of a fair use exception regarding Peak's use of MAI's
software. Had the court completed the fair use analysis in the MAI Systems
100 Id. (citation omitted).
101 Id. at 1523.
102 Id. at 1523-24.
103 Id. at 1524.
1)4 Id. at 1524-25.
105 Id. at 1526.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1526.
109Id.
1 10 Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984)).
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case, it might have concluded that Peak did not violate MAI's copyright
interests.
In MAI Systems, the purpose (first factor) of Peak's copying of the
executable code was to use the computer so it could be repaired. The copy was
created in the normal course of using the computer and indeed, it remained
internal to the computer. Peak was not interested in copying MAI's software in
order to distribute it to others nor was it interested in copying MAI's software
in order to develop a competing product. Peak's purpose in copying was, as in
the Sega case, "essentially non-exploitative."I I
The Sega court's conclusions regarding the nature of the copyrighted work
(second factor) and amount used (third factor) are the same in the MAI Systems
case. MAI's copyrighted work is a computer program which is, as the Sega
court noted, a utilitarian work that is afforded a lower degree of protection.1 12
Peak may have used the entire program, but, as the Sega court noted, use of
the entire work does not preclude a finding of fair use." 3 Therefore, these
factors weigh in Peak's favor.
In considering the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work (fourth factor), Peak's copying of licensed operating
system software during repair of the computer did not and could not have
displaced any sales for MAI's software. Peak's copying had no effect in the
market for MAI's software because the copy made was internal to the computer
and it was ephemeral. The copy disappeared when the computer was turned off
and so it could not be distributed anywhere else. There was no suggestion that
Peak made these internal, ephemeral copies available to anyone else. Anyone
who wanted a copy of MAI's software for a different use would have to obtain
it from another source, presumably MAI. Therefore, Peak's use did not
diminish potential sales, interfere with marketability, or usurp MAI's market
for its computer software.
Peak's interest in the software was limited to its interest in servicing the
computer. The fact that Peak's use may have affected MAI's share of the repair
market is not relevant to the discussion because the market for the copyrighted
work does not include the repair market for MAI computers. In fact, it appears
MAI used its copyright interests in an attempt to monopolize the repair
market-a practice, which the Sega court noted, runs contrary to the purpose of
promoting creative expression. 114 Without considering the possibility of a fair
use exception, the Ninth Circuit, perhaps unwittingly, permitted MAI to assert
I11 Id. at 1522-23.
112 Id. at 1526.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1523-24.
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its copyright interests to control use of the computer-and ultimately, the repair
market for its machines-rather than simply protect its copyrighted work.
V. USE OF THE MAI SSTEMS CASE AGAINST OTHER PARTIES
Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI Systems, 15 MAI sent cease
and desist letters, citing the favorable decision, to independent service
organizations.' 16  This action prompted several independent service
organizations to file suit against MAI. In Advanced Computer Services v. MAI
Systems Corp.,117 the plaintiffs alleged that MAI engaged in illegal tying and
monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act. 118 MAI counterclaimed
against the service organizations alleging infringement of its copyrighted
software."19 Using the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI Systems, 120 the district
court concluded that the service organizations violated MAI's copyright
interests in the operating system software when it was loaded into RAM after
the computer was turned on for servicing. 121 In contrast to the Ninth Circuit
case, the district court considered two defenses raised by the plaintiffs against
MAI's counterclaim-fair use and antitrust violations. 122
A. The Fair Use Defense
In analyzing the purpose and character of the use (first factor), the
Advanced Computer Services court concluded the purpose was commercial (use
of the copyrighted software was in connection with providing maintenance
services) and therefore, was presumptively unfair. 123 Next, the court concluded
the software's nature (second factor) was functional and so militated against a
115 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dirmissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
116 Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 359 (E.D. Va.
1994).
117 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
118 Id. at 359.
119 Id.
120MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
diirssed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994).
121 Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 360, 364.
122 Id. at 364-67.
123 Id. at 364 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984)).
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fair use finding. 124 The extent of the copying (third factor) also weighed
against a finding of fair use because the MAI software was copied in its entirety
as it was loaded into RAM. 125 According to the court, the first three factors
weighed against a finding of fair use.
In evaluating the effect of the use on the market for MAI software (fourth
factor), the court considered whether the use impaired the marketability of the
copyrighted work.126 The court concluded that the relevant market was the
market for licensing MAI's copyrighted software. 127 The unauthorized use, it
was decided, "deprives MAI of license fees associated with the use of their
software." 12 8 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court failed to
distinguish precisely which uses by the service technicians resulted in MAI's
loss of licensing fees. It was undisputed that some of the service organizations
possessed and used unlicensed copies of MAI's software. 129 The possession
and use of unlicensed MAI software clearly violates MAI copyright
interests. 130 The court also noted that the service organizations used the
operating system software when servicing computers at MAI customer sites. 131
The court did not, however, explain how MAI was deprived of license fees
when the service technicians used the operating system software that had been
licensed to, and was within the lawful possession of, MAI customers. 132
Neither MAI nor the court suggested that those copies of the software, made in
the course of operating the machine, were distributed to others thereby
depriving MAI of licensing fees. 133 The copy was internal and ephemeral and
therefore, could not have displaced any licensing fees for MAI.
124 Id. at 365 (citing Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir.
1992)).
125 Id. at 365-66.
126 Id. at 366 (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 361 ("It is undisputed that all plaintiffs... have MAI computers at their
offices and use MAI's copyrighted operating system software in their machines without
having obtained a license or any other permission from MAI.").
130 MAI's exclusive rights to copy and publicly distribute its software would have been
violated when the service technician (or possibly an MAI customer) copied and gave the
software to the technician.
131 Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 361 ("It is also undisputed that field
technicians of each plaintiff used MAI's operating system software... in the course of
servicing customers' computers.").
132 See supra note 37.
133 Indeed, by the court's own admission, there is no independent market for MAI's
operating system software. In reciting the facts of the case, the court acknowledged that




In an illegal tying claim under the antitrust allegations, the plaintiffs
accused MAI of tying licenses for MAI operating system software to
maintenance services for MAI computer equipment. 134 In evaluating this claim,
the court considered the following factors:
(1) The existence of two separate products;
(2) An agreement conditioning purchase of the tying product [MAI software]
upon purchase of the tied product [maintenance contract]... ;
(3) Seller's possession of sufficient economic power in tying product market
[MAI software] to restrain competition in tied product market [maintenance
contract]; and
(4) A not insubstantial impact on interstate commerce. 13 5
The court concluded that two separate products are involved because the
repair market is distinct from the MAI software market and demand for
maintenance services exists independently of demand for the software. 136 With
regard to the second factor, the court concluded that there was no evidence that
licensing of the MAI operating system was dependent upon the purchase of
maintenance services.137 Because the plaintiffs failed on the second factor, the
court did not consider the last two factors. 138
Although the court may have concluded correctly that licensing of the
operating system was not tied to the purchase of maintenance services (so that
there was no antitrust violation), the decision leaves MAI customers with
manufacturers' minicomputers." Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 359. This fact
suggests there is no market for MAI's operating system software independent of the market
for the hardware because the software simply cannot be used without MAI hardware.
Second, the court acknowledged "[tihe operating system software... is integrated into the
computer." Id. at 360. This fact suggests that MAI customers, in fact, license a bundled
system-they take the hardware and software in a package because neither can be used
without the other. As a result, it is difficult to determine how a technician could sell or
otherwise distribute an unlicensed copy of the software.
134 Id. at 360.
135 Id. at 367-68 (citing Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680,
683 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)).
136 Id. at 368.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 368-69.
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limited choices regarding maintenance of their computers. MAI customers may
purchase MAI maintenance services which, according to the court, are higher
priced than the services from independent organizations. 139 MAI customers are
also free to license the operating system as well as diagnostic software and train
one of their own employees in servicing the equipment. 140 This option,
however, may be cost effective for only large organizations with lots of
equipment. The final option is to use an independent service organization.
However, customers that use this option face the risk of a lawsuit for violation
of the licensing agreement. To avail themselves to the repair market,
independent service organizations must develop their own versions of the
operating system and diagnostic software which, the court admitted, can be
very expensive. 141 As a result of the court's conclusions, customers of MAI
computers have limited options for repair services.
The analysis of the antitrust tying issue is somewhat surprising in light of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical
Service.142 In Eastman Kodak, the Court analyzed the replacement parts and
service market in relation to Image Technical's allegation that Kodak's refusal
to sell replacement parts to independent service organizations constituted a
monopolization of the parts market. 143 The availability of essential parts only
through Kodak and the fact that some independent service organizations were
driven out of business as a result of Kodak's policy were cited by the Court as
factors that created a presumption of market power.144 Applying the Eastman
Kodak decision to the scenario described in MAI Systems, a software vendor
who attempts to control the repair market by refusing to license the operating
system software and by suing independent service organizations for copyright
infringement risks violating federal antitrust laws. However, the court in
Advanced Computer Services acknowledged the right of MAI to license
selectively, even if it affects the ability of competitors to provide repair
services. 145 The fact that MAI has copyright interests in its operating system
software (and thus a limited monopoly granted by law) may be enough to
distinguish its position from that of Kodak so that no antitrust concerns are
present. In some respects, however, the operating system serves the role of a
"part" in repair of the computer so that under the Eastman Kodak case, MAI's
actions would be prohibited.
139 Id. at 367.
140 Id. at 368.
141 Id. at 367-68.
142 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
143 Id. at 2089-92.
144Id.




In reaching the conclusion that MAI's copyright interests were violated, the
Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems and the district court in Advanced Computer
Systems failed to consider the implications of a decision that allows the use of
copyright law to control unauthorized use of computer software.
A. Technical Considerations in Applying the Decisions
The MAI Systems and Advanced Computer Services decisions, arguably, do
not apply to computer vendors who distribute the computer's operating system
in read only memory (ROM) instead of RAM. 146 If the operating system is
provided in ROM, then the computer may execute the program directly from
this location without first copying it into RAM. 147 If the operating system is
distributed in this manner, then a copy of the program is not made when the
computer is turned on. If no copying occurs when the computer is turned on,
then the decisions do not apply and an unauthorized user of the computer
cannot be guilty of copyright infringement.
The fact that the operating system is loaded into RAM for use is simply the
result of a technical design decision made by the computer vendor. Copying the
software into RAM makes the computer faster and more efficient. If a vendor
chooses to distribute the operating system in ROM (rather than on disk so it
must be copied into RAM), even unauthorized users of the software cannot be
guilty of copyright infringement because a copy of the software is never made.
This argument could, perhaps, be challenged on the basis that whether the
operating system resides in RAM or ROM, the instructions must be copied into
the processor's registers for execution. The copying of individual program
instructions into registers might then be considered the copying necessary to
find copyright infringement. However, during program execution, instructions
are quickly supplanted by subsequent instructions so that it would be difficult to
argue that the copy that is made is fixed for the purposes of copyright law.
Whatever the distribution medium and the extent of copying into registers,
this technical discussion illustrates the difficulty in using the unauthorized
starting of a computer as the basis for copyright infringement. The decisions
apply directly to cases in which a program must be copied into RAM to be
used by the computer. Its application to cases in which a program resides in
ROM is tenuous. The fact that no copying occurs when a program is
distributed in ROM suggests that the first question to answer in deciding the
146 VERGARI & SHuE, supra note 4, at 16-17, 22; MILLARD, supra note 5, at 13.
147 VERGARI & SHuE, supra note 4, at 16-17.
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issue of copyright infringement is what, exactly, did the machine do when it
was turned on. If copying of the program into RAM did not occur, then the
issue of copying of program instructions into registers must be considered. 148
This inquiry necessarily ignores the more important issues of why the computer
was turned on and what effect the use had on the copyright owner's interest in
the copyrighted work. If the purpose of turning on the computer is to repair it
and this use has no effect on the market for the copyrighted work (so that
copyright infringement does not occur), then the issue is resolved without a
detailed, technical inquiry regarding the extent of copying and where the
copying took place. In the absence of considering the purpose and effect of the
use, all users, whether covered by section 117 of the Copyright Act or not, are
susceptible to copyright infringement suits.
B. The Decisions Are Easily Circumvented
Even if the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems and the district court in Advanced
Computer Services were correct in concluding that the service technicians were
guilty of copyright infringement, the decision is easily circumvented. For
example, an MAI customer who is authorized under the licensing agreement to
use the software and, hence, to make a copy of the operating system in RAM
can simply turn on the computer prior to the repair technician's arrival. The
copy in RAM is then made by the authorized computer user (the MAI
customer) so the copying does not extend beyond the scope of the licensing
agreement such that copyright infringement occurs. If use of the program is
governed by a licensing agreement, the repair technician's use of the software
may violate this agreement, but the technician's use does not result in copyright
infringement based on unauthorized copying.
VII. CONCLUSION
MAI used its copyright interests in its software to control use of the
computers on which its programs run. By controlling use, MAI was able to
control the repair market for its computers. MAI acquired the control because
the Ninth Circuit was willing to find that the unauthorized use of software
resulted in copyright infringement even though the software was loaded into
RAM automatically and the copy remained internal to the computer. In
148 As noted earlier, individual instructions are copied so they may be executed.
Therefore, copying takes place incrementally so that at any one point in time, only a few
instructions of the program are duplicated within the machine. See supra notes 4-13 and
accompanying text.
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addition, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider whether section 117 protection
should have been extended to MAI customers because they are owners, rather
than licensees, of the software. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit ignored the
possibility of a fair use exception to Peak's use. Such an analysis would have
revealed that Peak did not violate MAI's copyright interests by using the
operating system software licensed to MAI customers.
The finding of copyright infringement in MA Systems should be reversed.
The decision extends software developers' exclusive rights at the expense of
software users who have legitimate reasons for using the computer and the
software. The Ninth Circuit's ruling permits software vendors to use copyright
interests in their programs to control who uses the machine and in what
capacity. In executable software cases, such as MAI Systems, in which copying
must occur for the computer to function, the unauthorized user should not be
liable for copyright infringement unless an analysis of the purpose of the
copying and the effect of use shows clear interference with the copyright
owner's interests.

